Tactical Errors: Union And Confederate Armies Were Hampered By Atlanta\u27s Landscape by Secrist, Philip L.
Civil War Book Review 
Winter 2001 Article 25 
Tactical Errors: Union And Confederate Armies Were Hampered 
By Atlanta's Landscape 
Philip L. Secrist 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/cwbr 
Recommended Citation 
Secrist, Philip L. (2001) "Tactical Errors: Union And Confederate Armies Were Hampered By Atlanta's 
Landscape," Civil War Book Review: Vol. 3 : Iss. 1 . 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/cwbr/vol3/iss1/25 
Review
TACTICAL ERRORS
Union and Confederate armies were hampered by Atlanta's landscape
Secrist, Philip L.
Winter 2001
McMurry, Richard M. Atlanta 1864: Last Chance for the Confederacy.
University of Nebraska Press, 2000-08-01. ISBN 803232128
In Atlanta 1864, Richard McMurry ably retraces the familiar scholarly
analysis of Confederate command interplay during the Atlanta campaign, in
which wartime field tent strategies collided with the long distance meddling of
Richmond. Disappointingly, nothing fresh and new rises from McMurry's effort.
In the author's account of the depressing and petty quarrelling among
Confederate generals and leaders during Atlanta's defense - a saga that features
Joseph E. Johnston, John Bell Hood, William J. Hardee, Braxton Bragg, and
Jefferson Davis - Johnston takes the biggest "hit." He earns much of the criticism
he gets, especially when his style of leadership is compared against the tactical
daring of Lee in Virginia. McMurry does his usual scholarly work in this regard
and his case is strong.
Where Atlanta 1864 suffers most is McMurry's failure to appreciate how
command decisions were influenced by topography, undergrowth, other natural
landscape features (rivers and small streams), incomplete or incorrect
information, and extremely poor roads along the 100-mile route of the Atlanta
campaign. For example, much is made of the discovery of the undefended Snake
Creek Gap and the opportunity it seemed to offer the Federals to trap the
Confederate army in Dalton on May 9.
Instead, the author should have made more of the missed Federal 
opportunity at Resaca on May 14 and 15 - which represented a chance to 
annihilate the Confederate army, trapped as it was with rivers at its rear and 
flank. Snake Creek Gap was the gate to the annihilation of the Confederate 
army, but Resaca, eight miles east on the Western and Atlantic Railroad (and 13
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miles south of Dalton), was the greater opportunity. And it was William
Sherman, not James McPherson, who muddled this at Resaca.
Had George Thomas's and McPherson's armies, with their right flanks
protected by the Oostenaula River, been ordered by Sherman to assault Leonidas
Polk's and Hardee's fronts, the Confederates would almost have certainly been
overwhelmed in position or destroyed in retreat crossing the rivers. Later in the
campaign, Sherman repeated this tactical blunder when his reluctance to "go for
the jugular" caused him to disregard Thomas's offer to use the Fourth and
Fourteenth Corps of his Army of the Cumberland to assault and most probably
destroy a majority of the rebel army at Jonesboro on September 1.
Disregard for critical topography and general conditions limiting troop
movement again clouds the author's judgment when, on page 88, McMurry
writes that Johnston could "have hurried west from Allatoona and confronted
Sherman while the Federals were on low ground along the left (south) bank of
the Etowah River." He adds that a United States army "staff ride" concluded a
century and a half later that this would have been the best opportunity in the
entire campaign for Johnston to have "fought with advantage."
The expertise of the army staff riders notwithstanding, given the condition
of the existing roads in 1864 along the south bank of the Etowah River from
Allatoona to Sherman's river crossing point near Kingston, a scheme to move an
entire army and its equipment such distance in a timely manner would have been
impossible. The only decent road west from Allatoona was the route Johnston
actually used (the direct road from Acworth to Dallas), and it was along this road
in the thickets and maze of ravines from Pickett's Mill through New Hope to
Dallas that the next battles took place.
Overall, Atlanta 1864: Last Chance for the Confederacy is a well-written
and well-researched study of the interplay of military/civilian bungling. Richard
McMurry's analysis of command decisions in the field is less convincing.
However, four chapters in the appendix are especially useful and concise:
"Chickamauga Fever and Grant's Grand Strategy for 1864"; "Numbers and
Losses"; "Johnston's Railroad Strategy"; and "The Atlanta Campaign and the
Election of 1864."
Philip L. Secrist is associate professor of history at Kennesaw State 
University and is the author of The Battle of Resaca (1998). His
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work-in-progress is entitled Tracing General Sherman's Route from Ringgold to
Jonesboro.
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